Abstract. In this paper we study the security of the RadioGatún family of hash functions, and more precisely the collision resistance of this proposal. We show that it is possible to find differential paths with acceptable probability of success. Then, by using the freedom degrees available from the incoming message words, we provide a significant improvement over the best previously known cryptanalysis. As a proof of concept, we provide a colliding pair of messages for RadioGatún with 2-bit words. We finally argue that, under some light assumption, our technique is very likely to provide the first collision attack on RadioGatún.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash functions is a very important tool in cryptography, used in many applications such as digital signatures, authentication schemes or message integrity. Informally, a cryptographic hash function H is a function from {0, 1} * , the set of all finite length bit strings, to {0, 1} n where n is the fixed size of the hash value. Moreover, a cryptographic hash function must satisfy the properties of preimage resistance, 2nd-preimage resistance and collision resistance [26] : -collision resistance: finding a pair x = x ∈ {0, 1} * such that H(x) = H(x ) should require 2 n/2 hash computations. -2nd preimage resistance: for a given x ∈ {0, 1} * , finding a x = x such that H(x) = H(x ) should require 2 n hash computations. -preimage resistance: for a given y ∈ {0, 1} n , finding a x ∈ {0, 1} * such that H(x) = y should require 2 n hash computations.
Generally, hash functions are built upon a compression function and a domain extension algorithm. A compression function h, usually built from scratch, should have the same security requirements as a hash function but takes fixed length inputs instead. Wang et al. [30, 32, 33, 31] recently showed that most standardized compression functions (e.g. MD5 or SHA-1) are not collision resistant. Then, a domain extension method allows the hash function to handle arbitrary length inputs by defining an (often iterative) algorithm using the compression function as a black box. The pioneering work of Merkle and Damgård [15, 27] provided to designers an easy way in order to turn collision resistant compression functions onto collision resistant hash functions. Even if preserving collision resistance, it has been recently shown that this iterative process presents flaws [16, 18, 20, 19] and new algorithms [24, 7, 2, 1, 25] with better security properties have been proposed.
Most hash functions instantiating the Merkle-Damgård construction use a block-cipher based compression function. Some more recent hash proposals are based on construction principles which are closely related to stream ciphers. For example we can cite Grindahl [23] or RadioGatún [4] . The underlying idea of stream-oriented functions is to first absorb m-bit message blocks into a big internal state of size c + m using a simple round function, and then squeeze the hash output words out. As the internal state is larger than the output of the hash function, the cryptanalytic techniques against the iterative constructions can not be transposed to the case of stream-oriented functions. In 2007, Bertoni et al. published a new hash construction mode, namely the sponge functions [6] . At Eurocrypt 2008, the same authors [5] published a proof of security for their construction : when assuming that the internal function F is a random permutation or a random transformation, then the sponge construction is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to 2 c/2 operations. However, even though the same authors designed RadioGatún and defined the sponge construction, RadioGatún does not completely fulfill the sponge definition. For evident performance reasons, the internal function F of RadioGatún is not a very strong permutation and this might lead to correlations between some input and output words. This threat is avoided by applying blank rounds (rounds without message incorporation) just after adding the last padded message word. More recently, some NIST SHA-3 candidates are using stream-oriented functions as well, for example SHABAL [10] , or sponge functions, for example Keccak [3] .
Regarding the Grindahl family of hash functions, apart from potential slide attacks [17] , it has been shown [28, 22] that it can not be considered as collision resistant. However, RadioGatún remains yet unarmed by the preliminary cryptanalysis [21] . The designers of RadioGatún claimed that for an instance manipulating w-bit words, one can output as much as 19 × w bits and get a collision resistant hash function. That is, no collision attack should exist which requires less than 2 9,5×w hash computations. The designers also stated [4] that the best collision attack they could find (apart from generic birthday paradox ones) requires 2 46×w hash computations. A first cryptanalysis result by Bouillaguet and Fouque [8] using algebraic technique showed that one can find collisions for RadioGatún with 2 24,5×w hash computations. Finally, Khovratovich [21] described an attack using 2 18×w hash computations and memory, that can find collisions with the restriction that the IV must chosen by the attacker (semifree-start collisions).
Our contributions. In this paper, we provide an improved cryptanalysis of RadioGatún regarding collision search. Namely, using an improved computer-aided backtracking search and symmetric differences, we provide a technique that can find a collision with 2 11×w hash computations and negligible memory. As a proof of concept, we also present a colliding pair of messages for the case w = 2. Finally, we argue that this technique has a good chance to lead to the first collision attack on RadioGatún (the computation cost for setting up a complete collision attack is below the ideal bound claimed by the designers, but still unreachable for nowadays computers).
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we describe the hash function proposal RadioGatún. Then, in Section 3, we introduce the concepts of symmetric differences and control words, that will be our two mains tools in order to cryptanalyze the scheme. In Section 4, we explain our differential path generation phase and in Section 5 we present our overall collision attack. Finally, we draw the conclusion in last section.
Description of RadioGatún
RadioGatún is a hash function using the design approach and correcting the problems of Panama [14] , StepRightUp [13] or Subterranean [11, 13] .
RadioGatún maintains an internal state of 58 words of w bits each, divided in two parts and simply initialized by imposing the zero value to all the words. The first part of the state, the mill, is composed of 19 words and the second part, the belt, can be represented by a matrix of 3 rows and 13 columns of words. We denote by M k i the i-th word of the belt state before application of the k-th iteration (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 18) and B k i,j represents the word located at column i and row j of the mill state before application of iteration k (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2).
The message to hash is first padded and then divided into blocks of m words of w bits each that will update the internal state iteratively. We denote by m k i the i-th word of the message block m k (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 2). Namely, for iteration k, the message block m k is firstly incorporated into the internal state and then a permutation P is applied on it. The incorporation process at iteration k is defined by :
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive or operation.
After having processed all the message blocks, the internal state is finally updated with N br blank rounds (simply the application of the permutation P , without incorporating any message block). Eventually, the hash output value is generated by successively applying P and then outputting M The permutation P can be divided into four parts. First, the Belt function is applied, then the MillToBelt function, the Mill function and eventually the BeltToMill function. This is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 . The Belt function simply consists of a row-wise rotation of the belt part of the state. That is, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 :
The MillToBelt function allows the mill part of the state to influence the belt one. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 11, we have :
The Mill function is the most complex phase of the permutation P and it updates the mill part of the state (see Figure 3) . In the following, all the indexes should be taken modulo 19. First, a non linear transformation is applied on all the words. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 18 :
where X denotes the bitwise negation of X and ∧ represents the bitwise and operation. Then, a diffusion phase inside the words is used. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 18 :
where X ≫ (y) denotes the rotation of X on the right over y positions. Then, a diffusion phase among all the words is applied. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 18 :
Finally, an asymmetry is created by simply setting
The BeltToMill function allows the belt part of the state to influence the mill one. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, we have : The RadioGatún security claims. Although RadioGatún has some common features with the sponge functions, the security proof of the sponge construction does not apply for this proposal. In their original paper [4] , the authors claim that RadioGatún can output as much as 19 words and remain a secure hash function. Thus, it should not be possible for an attacker to find a collision attack running in less than 2 9,5×w hash computations.
3 Symmetric differences and control words
Symmetric differences
The first cryptanalysis tool we will use are symmetric differences, already mentioned in [4] . More precisely, a symmetric difference is an intra-word exclusive or difference that is part of a stable subspace of all the possible differences on a w-bit word. For example, in the following we will use the two difference values 0 w and 1 w (where the exponentiation by x denotes the concatenation of x identical strings), namely either a zero difference or either a difference on every bit of the word.
Considering those symmetric differences will allow us to simplify the overall scheme. Regarding the intra-word rotations during the Mill function, a 0 w or a 1 w difference will obviously remain unmodified. Moreover, the result of an exclusive or operation between two symmetric differences will naturally be a symmetric difference itself :
The non linear part of the Mill function is more tricky. We can write :
The output of this transformation will remain a symmetric difference with a certain probability of success, given in Table 1 .
Due to the use of symmetric differences, the scheme to analyze can now be simplified : we can concentrate our efforts on a w = 1 version of RadioGatún, for which the intra-word rotations can be discarded. However, when building a differential path, for each differential transition during the non linear part of the Mill function, we will have to take the corresponding probability from Table 1 in account 3 . Note that this probability will be the only source of uncertainty in the differential paths we will consider (all the differential transitions through exclusive or operation always happen with probability equal to 1) and the product of all probabilities will be the core of the final complexity of the attack.
Also, one can check that the conditions on the Mill function input words are not necessarily independent. One may have to control differential transitions for non linear subfonctions located on adjacent positions (for example the first subfunction, involving M 0 and M 1 , and the second, involving M 1 and M 2 ). This has two effects : potential incompatibility or condition compression (concerning M 1 in our example). In the first case, two conditions are located on the same input word and are contradicting (for example, one would have both M 1 = 0 w and M 1 = 1 w ). Thus, the differential path would be impossible to verify and, obviously, one has to avoid this scenario. For the second case, two conditions apply on the same input word but are not contradicting. Here, there is a chance that those conditions are redundant and we only have to account one time for a probability 2 −w . Finally, note that all those aspects have to be handled during the differential path establishment and not during the search for a valid pair of messages.
Control words
When trying to find a collision attack for a hash function, two major tools are used : the differential path and the freedom degrees. In the next section, we will describe how to find good differential paths using symmetric differences. If a given path has probability of success equal to P , the complexity of a naive attack would be 1/P operations : if one chooses randomly and non-adaptively 1/P random message inputs that are coherent with the differential constraints, there is a rather good chance that a pair of them will follow the differential path entirely. However, for the same differential path, the complexity of the attack can be significantly decreased if the attacker chooses its inputs in a clever and adaptive manner.
In the case of RadioGatún, 3 w-bit message words are incorporated into the internal state at each round. Those words will naturally diffuse into the whole internal state, but not immediately. Thus, it is interesting to study how this diffusion behaves. Since the events we want to control through the differential path are the transitions of the non linear part of the Mill function (which depend on the input words of the Mill function), we will only study the diffusion regarding the input words of the Mill function. Table 2 gives the dependencies between the message words incorporated at an iteration k, and the 19 input words of the Mill function at iteration k, k + 1 and k + 2. One can argue that a modification of a message block does not necessarily impacts the input word marked by a tick in Table 2 because the non linear function can sometimes "absorb" the diffusion of the modification. However, we emphasize that even if we depict here a behavior on average for the sake of clarity, all those details are taken in account thanks to our computer-aided use of the control words. 
An improved backtracking search
Our aim is to find internal collisions, i.e. collisions on the whole internal state before application of the blank rounds.
In order to build a good differential path using symmetric differences, we will use a computer-aided meet-in-the-middle approach, similar to the technique in [28] . More precisely, we will build our differential path DP by connecting together separate paths DP f and DP b . We emphasize that, in this section, we only want to build the differential path and not to look for a colliding pair of messages. DP f will be built in the forward direction starting from an internal state containing no difference (modeling the fact that we have no difference after the initialization of the hash function), while DP b will be built in the backward direction of the hash computation starting from an internal state containing no difference (modeling the fact that we want a collision at the end of the path).
Starting from an internal state with no difference, for each round the algorithm will go through all the possible differences incorporation of the message input (remember that we always use symmetric differences, thus we only have 2 3 = 8 different cases to study) and all the possible symmetric differences transitions during the Mill function according to Table 1 (the differential transitions through exclusive or operations are fully deterministic). The algorithm can be compared to a search tree in which the depth represents the number of rounds of RadioGatún considered and each leaf or sub-leaf is a reachable differential internal state.
Entropy
An exhaustive search in this tree would obviously imply making useless computations (some parts of the tree provide too costly differential path anyway). To avoid this, we always compute an estimation of the cost of finding a message pair fulfilling the differential paths during the building phase of the tree, from an initial state to the current leaf in the forward direction, and from the current leaf to colliding states in the backward direction.
A first idea would be to compute the current cost of DP f and DP b during the meet-in-the-middle phase. But, as mentioned in Section 3, some words of the mill only depend on the inserted message block after 1 or 2 rounds. Therefore, some conditions on the mill value have to be checked 2 rounds earlier, and some degrees of freedom may have to be used to fulfill conditions two rounds later. As DP f and DP b are computed round per round, it is difficult to compute their complexity during the search phase, while having an efficient early-abort algorithm.
Therefore, we use an ad hoc parameter, denoted H k and defined as follows. If c k is the total number of conditions on the mill input words at round k (from Table 1 ), we have for a path of length n :
The idea is to evaluate the number of message pairs required at step k in order to get 2 w×H k+1 message pairs at step k + 1 of the exhaustive search phase. To achieve this, one needs to fulfill c k × w bit conditions on the mill input values, with 3 × w degrees of freedom. Therefore, the values of H k can be viewed as the relative entropies on the successive values of the internal state during the hash computation.
The final collision search complexity would be 2 w×Hmax , where H max is the maximum value of H i along the path, if the adversary could choose 3 words of his choice at each step, and if each output word of the Mill function depended on all the input words. In the case of RadioGatún, the computation cost is more complex to evaluate, and this is described in Section 5.
Differential path search algorithm
The path search algorithm works as follows. We first compute candidates for DP f with a modified breadth-first search algorithm, eliminating those for which the maximum entropy exceeds the minimum entropy by more than 8×w (because we want to remain much lower than the 9, 5 × w bound from the birthday paradox). The algorithm differs from a traditional breadth-first search as we do not store all the nodes, but only those with an acceptable entropy : to increase the probability of linking it to DP b , one only stores the nodes whose entropy is at least (H max − 4) × w. We also store the state value of the previous node with entropy at least (H max − 4) × w, to enable an efficient backtracking process once the path is found. We then compute DP b , using a depth-first search among the backwards transitions of the Mill function, starting from colliding states. We set the initial entropy to H n = 0, and we do not search the states for which H > 8 (same reason as for DP f : we want to remain much lower than the bound from the birthday paradox). For each node having an entropy at most 4, we try to link it with a candidate for DP f .
Complexity of the path search phase
The total amount of possible values for a symmetric differential on the whole state is 2 13×3+19 = 2 58 . We use the fact that for RadioGatún, the insertion of M ⊕ M can be seen as the successive insertions of M and M without applying the round function. Therefore, we can consider setting the words 16, 17, 18 of the stored mill to 0 by a message insertion before storing it in the forward phase, and doing the same in the backward phase before comparing it to forward values. Therefore, the space on which the meet-in-the-middle algorithm has to find a collision has approximately 2 55 elements. We chose to store 2 27 values of DP f , and thus we have to compare approximately 2 28 values for DP b .
The collision attack
In this section, we depict the final collision attack, and compute its complexity. Once a differential path is settled, the derived collision attack is classic : we will use the control words to increase as much as possible the probability of success of the differential path.
Description
The input for this attack is a differential path, with a set of sufficient conditions on the values of the mill to ensure that a pair of messages follow the path. The adversary searches the colliding pairs in a tree, in which the nodes are messages following a prefix of the differential path. The leaves are messages following the whole differential path. Thanks to an early-abort approach, the adversary eliminates candidates as soon as they differ from the differential path. Nodes are associated with messages, therefore they will be denoted by the message they stand for. The sons of node M are then messages M ||b, where b is a given message block, and the hash computation of M ||b fulfills all the conditions. The adversary then uses a depth-first approach to find at least one node at depth n, where n is the length of the differential path. It is based on the trail backtracking technique, described in [4, 28] . To decrease the complexity of the algorithm, we check the conditions on the words of the mill as soon as they cannot be modified anymore by a message word inserted later.
From Table 2 , we know that the k-th included message block impacts some words of the mill before the k-th iteration of the Mill function, some other words before the k + 1-th iteration, and the rest of the mill words before the k + 2-th iteration. We recall that m k is the k-th inserted block, and we now set that M k j is the value of the j-th mill word after the k-th message insertion. Let alsô M k j be the value of the j-th word of the mill after the k-th nonlinear function computation.
After inserting m k , one can then compute M . The probability that this system is consistent depends on dimension of the Kernel of the system and can be computed a priori. 
Computation of the cost
We will now explain how to compute the complexity of the collision search algorithm. The most expensive operation is the search of the sons of nodes. The total complexity of a given depth level k is the product of the number of nodes that have to be explored at depth k by the average cost of the search of these nodes. These parameters are exponential in w, therefore the total cost of the search can be approximated by the search of the most expensive nodes.
To compute the search cost, we assume that for all considered messages, the words of the resulting states for which no condition is imposed are independent and identically distributed. This is true at depth 0, provided the attacker initializes the search phase with a long random message prefix. The identical distribution of the variables can be checked recursively, their independence is an hypothesis for the attack to work. This assumption is well-known in the field of hash function cryptanalysis for computing the cost associated to a differential path (see e.g. [28] ).
Let A k be the number of nodes that have to be reached at depth k, and C k the average cost of searching one of these nodes. Let P k be the probability that a random son of a node at depth k follows the differential path, and Q k the probability that a given node at depth k has at least one valid son. At depth k, the average number of explored nodes is related to the average number of explored nodes at depth k + 1. When only a few nodes are needed, the average case is not sufficient, and one has to evaluate the cost of finding at least one valid node of depth k + 1.
One has the following relations, for k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}:
Let K k be the dimension of the Kernel of the linear system that has to be solved at depth k, andP k the probability that the bitwise system of equations on the values of the mill before and after the nonlinear function has solutions. P k can be computed exhaustively a priori for each value of k. which is true provided the free words -i.e. without conditions fixing their values, or linking it to another word -are i.i.d. A random node at depth k has at least one valid son if the two following conditions happen :
-The bitwise conditions at depth k and k + 1 can be fulfilled, -The remaining freedom degrees can be used to fulfill all the remaining conditions.
The first item takes account of the fact that some conditions might not depend on all the freedom degrees. Therefore, we have :
where N k CON D is the total number of conditions that has to be checked on the k-th message insertion. We also have P k = 2 −N k CON D , because each condition is supposed to be fulfilled with probability half in the average case, which is true provided the free words -i.e. without conditions fixing their values, or linking it to another word -are i.i.d. .
Searching a node works as follows : one solves the bitwise system of equations on the values of M 16 , M 17 , M 18 ,M 14 , . . . ,M 18 . The set of message blocks that fulfill this equation system then has to be searched exhaustively to fulfill the other conditions, and to generate nodes at depth k + 1. C k is then the cost of this exhaustive search, and can be computed as the average number of message blocks that fulfill the system of equations. Therefore, we have C k = 2 3wP k . For each node at depth k, the attacker can first check the consistency of the conditions on the mill words at steps k and k + 1, which allows him not to search inconsistent nodes. Therefore, we have the following overall complexity :
The best path we found has complexity about 2 11×w , which is above the security claimed by the designers of RadioGatún [4] , it is given in Appendix. As a proof of concept, we also provide in Appendix an example of a colliding pair of messages following our differential path for RadioGatún with w = 2. One can check that the observed complexity confirms the estimated one.
Breaking the birthday bound
Finding a final collision attack for RadioGatún with a computation complexity of 2 11w required us to own a computer with a big amount of RAM for a few hours of computation. Yet, the memory and computation cost of the differential path search phase is determined by the H max chosen by the attacker. We conducted tests that tend to show that the search tree is big enough in order to find a collision attack with an overall complexity lower than the birthday bound claimed by the designers 4 . The problem here is that the memory and computation cost of the differential path search will be too big for nowadays computers, but much lower than the birthday bound. This explains why we are now incapable of providing a fully described collision attack for RadioGatún. However, we conjecture that applying our techniques with more memory and computation resources naturally leads to a collision attack for RadioGatún, breaking the ideal birthday bound.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an improved cryptanalysis of RadioGatún regarding collision search. Our attack can find collisions with a computation cost of about 2 11w and negligible memory, which is by far the best known attack on this proposal.
We also gave arguments that shows that RadioGatún might not be a collision resistant hash function. We conjecture that applying our differential path search technique with more constraints will lead to collision attacks on RadioGatún. We also give an estimation of the search cost at each step, as computed in section 5. In the column Nodes, we give the estimated value of log 2 w (A i ), which is the logarithmic value of the estimated number of nodes the attacker has to search at depth i. In the column Cost, we give the estimated value of log 2 w (
, which is the logarithmic value of the estimated search cost at depth i.
Input Output
Step Belt Mill Belt Mill Nodes Cost 0 0000 0000 0000 00000 0000 0000 0000 00000 1.000 4.000 1 0000 0000 0000 00000 0000 0000 0000 00000 4.000 6.000 2 0001 0000 0000 10000 0002 0000 0000 20034 4.000 6.000 3 0002 0001 0000 00034 0014 0026 0000 7a065 2.000 1.678 4 0014 0027 0000 5a065 0028 006a 0040 30000 0.000 3.000 5 0029 006b 0040 00000 0052 00d6 0080 00000 0.000 3.000 6 0052 00d6 0080 00000 00a4 01ac 0100 00000 1.000 4.000 7 00a4 01ac 0100 00000 0148 0358 0200 00000 4. 6.000 141 0241 0090 1020 505e2 0000 0000 0001 40000 0.000 3.000 142 0000 0000 0000 00000 0000 0000 0000 00000 0.000 3.000
For large values of w, we can approximate the total search cost by the search cost of the most expensive states. Here we have 4 steps with search cost 2 11w , therefore we can approximate the collision search cost by :
Appendix B: collision for RadioGatún [2] We give here a collision for the 2-bit version of RadioGatún. One can easily check that it follows the differential path given above. We write the message words using values between 0 and 3, which stand for the possible values of 2-bit words. In the column N odes, we give the number A i of nodes that have been searched at depth i to find a collision. In the column log 4 (N odes), we give the logarithm with base 4 of A i , which can be compared with the theoric values given by the computation of the path, as 4 = 2 w . We can notice some differences between the theoric cost and the observed cost. Let us recall that the theoric number of nodes at step i linearly depends on the theoric number of nodes at step i + 1. As a consequence, if at some step i 0 , more nodes have to be searched than expected, it will also affect the number of searched nodes at the previous steps. In our collision, we notice that these differences mainly arise at steps for which only a few nodes are needed, which can be explained as the theoric number of nodes is computed on average.
To ensure that one has enough starting points, we used a 5-block common prefix.
The common value of the internal state is then : Step i M 0 M 1 N odes log 4 (N odes) -5 330 330 16 2.000 -4 000 000 16 2.000 -3 000 000 16 2.000 Continued on next page
